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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past six years, three of the most remarkable bankruptcy 
cases in American history have come out of Detroit. In 2009, the 
U.S. government arranged for Chrysler and General Motors, two of 
the three major automakers, to file for bankruptcy and shed a 
substantial portion of their liabilities through a process that lasted a 
little more than a month in each case.1  In 2013, Detroit became the 
first major American city to file for bankruptcy.2  Its bankruptcy 
proved more time consuming, but Detroit too has restructured its 
obligations remarkably quickly. 
Prior to Chrysler and General Motors, bailouts and bankruptcy 
were non-overlapping alternatives. The government sometimes 
                                                                                                                                     
† S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
I am grateful to Juliet Moringiello for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 See A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bankruptcies of Chrysler 
and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 532-33 (2010) 
(describing the unique bankruptcy process used with Chrysler and General 
Motors intended to "make it easier . . . to clear away old liabilities"). 
2 Christopher J. Tyson, Municipal Identity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 647, 695 (2014). 
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bailed out a major corporation—as it did with Chrysler in 19793—
and it sometimes allowed major corporations to file for 
bankruptcy, as with Delta,4 United,5 and the other airlines.6  But it 
historically did not combine the two.7  Chrysler and GM broke the 
mold, as the federal government pumped roughly $15 billion into 
Chrysler8 and $50 billion into GM,9 and the government dictated 
the bankruptcy process as well. Detroit's bankruptcy was surprising 
for somewhat similar reasons: no state had previously permitted a 
major municipality to file for bankruptcy.10  When New York City 
fell into serious financial distress in 1974-75, the state intervened 
by providing more than $2 billion in rescue financing, but it 
actively discouraged the bankruptcy option. 11  Michigan, by 
                                                                                                                                     
3  Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the 
Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1349-51 (2011) (explaining the 
features of the 1979 Chrysler bailout). 
4 Kristina McQuaid, Delta & Northwest File for Bankruptcy: Is it Time to 
Ground a Major Airline?, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 663, 665-66 (2007). 
5  Terry G. Sanders, The Runway to Settlement: Rejection of Collective 
Bargaining Agreements in Airline Bankruptcies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1401, 1401 
n.1 (2007) (noting United Airlines filed for bankruptcy in 2002). 
6 See McQuaid, supra note 4, at 665-66 (stating that Northwest Airlines 
Corp. is another airline to file for bankruptcy); Sanders, supra note 5, at 1401 
(listing multiple airlines that have filed for bankruptcy). 
7 The government did establish a liquidity fund for the airlines in the wake 
of 9/11, but access to the fund was severely limited after it was set up. See 
Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to 
Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 367, 382-83 (2003) (noting that in order to qualify 
to receive funds, five requirements must be met). 
8 David Goldman, CNNMoney.com's Bailout Tracker, CNN, http://money
.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/ (last visited Sept. 22, 
2014). 
9 Id. 
10  See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403, 407 (2014) (noting that prior to the 
Detroit filing, Stockton, California, was the largest city by population ever to 
file for bankruptcy). 
11 Among the best accounts of the New York City crisis are: ROBERT W. 
BAILEY, THE CRISIS REGIME: THE MAC, THE EFCB, AND THE POLITICAL 
IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK CITY FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 (1984); SEYMOUR P. 
LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THE MAN WHO SAVED NEW YORK: HUGH 
CAREY AND THE GREAT FISCAL CRISIS OF 1975 at 156-57 (2010); MARTIN 
SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS / FISCAL CRISIS: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
NEW YORK CITY xi (1985); see also Jesse Nankin & Krista Kjellman Schmidt, 
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contrast, authorized Detroit's bankruptcy filing after putting 
Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr in place to run the city;12 and 
Michigan did not provide rescue funding until after Detroit had 
first filed for bankruptcy, as part of the elaborate "Grand Bargain" 
transaction13 at the heart of the restructuring. 
Detroit's and the automakers' bankruptcies share a second key 
feature as well.  Chrysler, General Motors, and the City of Detroit 
all were staggered by the legacy costs of their obligations to 
unionized retirees.14   Many of these promises came during the 
heyday of Detroit and the Big Three automakers, and the costs 
became increasingly unsustainable as the fortunes of each 
declined.  To have any hope for a brighter future, the carmakers 
and Detroit needed to restructure their employee and retiree 
obligations. 15  Yet, the political and humanitarian costs of 
                                                                                                                                     
History of U.S. Gov't Bailouts, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.
propublica.org/special/government-bailouts (noting that New York City was 
given $2.3 billion in loans). 
12 See Matt Helms, Nancy Kaffer, & Stephen Henderson, Detroit Files for 
Bankruptcy, Setting Off Battles with Creditors, Pensions, Unions, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (July 19, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130718/news01/307
180107/Detroit-bankruptcy-filing-Kevyn-Orr-emergency-manager (explaining 
Orr's Chapter 9 filing after failed attempts to reach other settlements). 
13 Nicholas O'Donnell, Detroit Institute of Arts Grand Bargain Not Done 
Yet, Creditors Claim to Have Purchaser Willing to Pay Nearly $2 Billion for 
Entire Collection, ART LAW REPORT (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.artlaw
report.com/2014/04/23/detroit-institute-of-arts-grand-bargain-not-done-yet-
creditors-claim-purchaser-willing-to-pay-nearly-2-billion-for-entire-collection/ 
(detailing the importance of this transaction within Detroit's plan of adjustment). 
14 See Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 
MICH. L. REV. 727, 733 (2010) (noting Chrysler's debt to retiree benefit plans); 
Joseph H. Smolinsky, Retooling General Motors: Defending an Innovative Use 
of the Bankruptcy Code to Save America's Auto Industry, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. 
& COM. L. 103, 106 (2011) (noting the increased legacy costs as a driving force 
of GM's need to restructure); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The 
Detroit Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated With Pensions, Benefits, and 
Municipal Securities Never Die . . . And How They Are Killing Cities Like 
Detroit, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 782-86 (2014) (discussing the city of 
Detroit's legacy costs for retired workers). 
15 See Richard A. Epstein, Political Bankruptcies: How Chrysler and GM 
Have Changed the Rules of the Game, FEE (Nov. 18, 2009), 
http://fee.org/the_freeman/detail/political-bankruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-
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redefining the union contracts—which once offered a middle class 
life to tens of thousands of blue-collar workers 16 —made 
restructuring extremely difficult. 
This is where bankruptcy came into play.  Bankruptcy made 
rescue funding more palatable to Republican lawmakers who 
would have resisted a bailout outside of bankruptcy.17  But it also 
exposed employees and retirees to the prospect of a severe 
restructuring, since both are treated as general creditors in 
bankruptcy.18  Chrysler, GM, and Detroit have each used carefully 
structured bankruptcy sale transactions to cushion the blow for 
retirees in particular.  Although sales are, in form, the most market-
oriented of transactions, the sales in these cases were designed to 
insulate a favored arrangement from market interference. Chrysler 
and General Motors sold their assets to newly created entities 
dubbed New Chrysler and New GM, while Detroit transferred the 
art in its world-class art museum—as well as the museum itself—
                                                                                                                                     
have-changed-the-rules-of-the-game (highlighting the dire need of the auto 
companies to restructure debts accrued from retirement plans). 
16 See, e.g,, Thomas Sugrue, The Rise and Fall of Detroit's Middle Class, 
NEWYORKER.COM (July 22, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/the-rise-and-fall-of-detroits-middle-class (noting that the "traditional 
avenue to a life of at least modest comfort for black Detroiters . . . was the 
[unionized] auto industry"). 
17 The administration of President George W. Bush did provide substantial 
rescue funding to Chrysler and General Motors before they filed for bankruptcy, 
but it used Troubled Asset Recovery Program funds that were designed to 
protect the banking industry to do so. Although Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson had previously promised not to use TARP for carmaker bailouts, he 
changed his mind, knowing that Congress was highly unlikely to approve a 
bailout.  See, e.g., Wendy Jones, Paulson, Bernanke Testify, Get Grilled, NBC 
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2008), http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2008/11/18/442
5489-paulson-bernanke-testify-get-grilled (quoting Paulson testimony that 
"TARP is aimed at the financial system" and that "in terms of autos, I have said 
it would not be a good thing"). 
18 See George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 
19, 74-75 (2004) (stating that employees are creditors); see also Mary Williams 
Walsh, Bond Insurer Syncora Claims Mediator Favors Detroit's Retirees, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/big-bond-
insurer-syncora-files-objection-to-detroits-bankruptcy-plan/?_php=true&
_type=blogs&_r=0 (noting that Detroit retirees, as one group of creditors, faced 
cuts to their pensions). 
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to a new nonprofit organization that is committed to keep the art in 
Detroit.19 
The first and most important of this Article's two objectives is 
to show that the Grand Bargain at the heart of the Detroit 
bankruptcy is the direct offspring of the bankruptcy sale 
transactions that were used to restructure Chrysler and GM.  The 
proponents of Detroit's Grand Bargain never would have dreamed 
up the transaction were it not for the federal government-
engineered carmaker bankruptcies.  Perhaps not coincidentally, the 
same law firm represented both Chrysler and Detroit,20 although 
the Chrysler precedent was probably as important an inspiration as 
the continuity in law firms. 
Although the carmaker sales made the Grand Bargain 
possible, the road did not begin with the Auto Task Force. After 
the current bankruptcy laws were enacted in 1978, debtors nearly 
always were restructured through a traditional reorganization 
process, not by sales.21  While substantial bankruptcy sales were 
not unprecedented, they were quite uncommon for well over a 
decade after the bankruptcy laws were put in place.  By the mid-
1990s, however, sales became an increasingly routine strategy for 
resolving financial distress.22  Prior to the rise of the bankruptcy 
sale, the Chrysler and General Motors strategies would not have 
been conceivable; after it, they were. 
From this perspective, the Chrysler, GM and Detroit sales 
were extreme versions of a very common trend.  In part because 
they are extreme, the sales have highlighted inadequacies of the 
largely ad hoc regulatory framework bankruptcy courts have used 
                                                                                                                                     
19  See Warburton, supra note 1, at 534-35, 537-38 (explaining the 
distinction between "Old Chrysler" and "New Chrysler," and between "Old GM" 
and "New GM"); Sherri Welch, Nonprofit to Manage 'Grand Bargain' Pension 
Donations, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUSINESS (July 6, 2014), http://www.crainsdetroit
.com/article/20140706/news/307069980/nonprofit-to-manage-grand-bargain-
pension-donations# (noting the transfer of the art museum "to the nonprofit that 
runs it"). 
20 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
21 See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-
Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1905, 1920 (2004) (noting the 
shift). 
22 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the 
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L. J. 862, 901 (2014). 
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to decide whether and when to approve a proposed sale.23  This 
Article's second objective is to highlight the need to fine-tune the 
treatment of bankruptcy sales, and briefly to suggest—as I and 
others have done in other work—possible adjustments. 
Part II of the Article surveys the increased use of bankruptcy 
sales and related shifts in Chapter 11 practice over the past several 
decades.  Part III describes the Chrysler and General Motors 
bankruptcies, which built on, but radically expanded the scope of a 
bankruptcy sale.  Part IV turns to the Detroit bankruptcy, focusing 
primarily on the "Grand Bargain," while also exploring the city's 
use of another recent bankruptcy strategy, known as "gifting."  The 
Article concludes, in a brief final part, that the Detroit cases have 
pushed recent bankruptcy innovations to their logical extremes—
and beyond—exposing the need to update the oversight of 
bankruptcy sales. 
II.  THE NEW ERA OF BANKRUPTCY SALES 
The basic trajectory of Chapter 11 reorganization practice in 
the past several decades is by now quite well-known.  Responding 
to the agenda control that the debtor enjoys in Chapter 11, creditors 
began using contractual provisions such as the covenants in debtor-
in-possession financing agreements and performance-based 
compensation bonuses to encourage a more timely reorganization 
process.24 
                                                                                                                                     
23 See, e.g., In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(illustrating the conflict courts face in determining whether and when to approve 
a sale); In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (using the 
Lionel framework of business necessity to justify a sale); see also In re General 
Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (using the 
"business judgment rule" as framework for approval of a sale). 
24  See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of 
Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 781-85 (2002) (identifying and explaining 
creditors' use of contractual provisions "to ensure that control rights lie in the 
appropriate hands"); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditor's Ball: The "New" New 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 917, 918-19 (2003) 
(describing how the "new Chapter 11 governance is contractual in nature," using 
both debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing and performance-based compensation 
packages as "important governance levers"). 
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The most important of these developments for my purposes 
was an increased use of bankruptcy sales as an alternative to the 
traditional reorganization process.25  Rather than negotiating the 
terms of a reorganization with their creditors and then submitting 
the proposed plan to a vote—a process that takes months at best—
many debtors arrange to sell most or all of their assets to a buyer 
through an auction process early in the bankruptcy case.26  Often, 
the debtor's lender insists on the sale as a prerequisite to making a 
loan, and in a large minority of cases the lender itself is the 
expected buyer.27 
In this part, I very briefly chronicle the structure and treatment 
of bankruptcy sales. I then describe a related development that will 
also prove relevant later in the Article: gifting transactions. 
A.  Reorganization by Bankruptcy Sale 
The statutory basis for a bankruptcy sale is section 363(b), 
which does little more than state that the debtor, "after notice and a 
hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of 
business, property of the estate."28  This section requires the debtor 
to obtain court approval if it wishes to enter into transactions that 
are outside the ordinary course of business.29  The drafters of the 
Bankruptcy Code assumed that debtors might use this provision to 
sell a few of their assets—say, a piece of equipment the debtor no 
longer needs.  They do not seem to have imagined that a debtor 
                                                                                                                                     
25 Baird and Rasmussen were the first scholars to draw sustained attention 
to the increased use of bankruptcy sales. See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra 
note 24, at 751-52 (2002); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, 
Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 685-89 (2003) [hereinafter Baird 
& Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight]. 
26  Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the 
Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 99 (2010). 
27 For concerns about sales in which the same party serves as both lender 
and buyer, see Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based 
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
425, 465-67 (2006). 
28 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012). Section 363(b) refers to the "trustee," but 
trustees are rarely appointed in a Chapter 11 case. In Chapter 11, the debtor (as 
"debtor in possession") usually continues to run the business and is given the 
same powers that a trustee would have. Id. § 1107(a). 
29 Id. § 363(b) (setting forth basic requirements for sales of property). 
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might use section 363 to sell all of its assets.  But section 363 
proved quite attractive because the process was fast and required 
only the bankruptcy judge's approval.  Selling assets in connection 
with a reorganization plan, by contrast, is much more cumbersome 
and necessitates an elaborate voting process.30 
As the popularity of section 363 sales increased, bankruptcy 
judges developed an increasingly standardized process for 
handling them.  Although section 363 does not say anything about 
an auction, most judges require that a proposed sale take the form 
of an auction that gives potential bidders at least thirty days to 
submit a bid.31  The debtor generally secures an initial bid from a 
"stalking horse" before proposing the sale. 32  Sometimes other 
bidders emerge, but often they do not.  To increase the likelihood it 
will prevail, the initial bidder may ask for protections, such as 
"qualified bid requirements" that impose restrictions on the terms 
of potential bids.33 
In addition to buying the debtor's assets, buyers also often 
agree to assume some of the debtor's ongoing contracts with 
                                                                                                                                     
30 11 U.S.C. § 1122 sets the parameters for dividing the holders of claims 
and interests into classes, and 11 U.S.C. § 1126 sets forth the voting rules. Id. 
§§ 1122, 1126. If each class votes yes, and the plan satisfies fifteen other 
requirements, it can be confirmed under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). Id. § 1129(a).  If 
one or more classes vote no, the plan can only be confirmed if it meets the 
requirements for "cramdown" under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Id. § 1129(b). 
31 In 2006, the U.S Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York released a set of guidelines for bankruptcy sales. In re Adoption of 
Guidelines for the Conduct of Asset Sales, General Order M-331 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/court-
info/local-rules-and-orders/general-orders. Other courts have similar guidelines. 
See Hower v. Molding Sys. Eng'g Corp., 445 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(describing judge's allotment of thirty days for bids to be taken). 
32 See generally Gary W. Marsh & B. Summer Chandler, The Pros and 
Cons of Being a Stalking Horse Bidder for Assets in Bankruptcy, NATIONAL 
REAL ESTATE INVESTOR (Feb. 18, 2010), http://nreionline.com/print/dis
tress/pros-and-cons-being-stalking-horse-bidder-assets-bankruptcy (analyzing 
the pros and cons of being a stalking horse). 
33 One common restriction only permits bids that exceed the initial bid by a 
specified amount. For an overview of qualified bid requirements, see N. Lynn 
Hiestand, Jeffery Steinle, & Alexa Paliwal, Distressed Asset Sales: Selling and 
Acquiring from the Debtor Estate, reprinted in 26TH ANNUAL CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION, vol. 1, at 935, 954 
(2004). 
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suppliers or other creditors.34  In most cases, however, the portion 
of the overall price paid by the buyer that consists of the 
assumption of debt is comparatively small.35 
The surge in bankruptcy sales has generated intense debate in 
the bankruptcy literature.  One prominent study suggested that 
creditors recover considerably less if the debtor's financial distress 
is resolved through a sale than if the debtor used the traditional 
reorganization process.36 
B. Gifting 
In recent years, the assets that a corporate debtor seeks to sell 
through a section 363 sale have often been fully encumbered—that 
is, they are collateral for a secured creditor that is owed as much or 
more than the assets are likely to sell for.37  Often, the secured 
creditor itself intends to acquire the assets either by credit bidding 
or by making a cash bid.38  In other cases, a third party will buy the 
assets, with the proceeds going to the secured creditors.39  If the 
assets are fully encumbered, the debtor's unsecured creditors are 
the odd ones out.  If they stand idly by, the case will, in effect, 
inure entirely to the benefit of the secured creditors and the buyer, 
with nothing left over for other creditors.40  Unsecured creditors 
can be expected to protest loudly if they expect to be left empty-
handed, and this is precisely what they do.  They invariably object 
to the sale or threaten to do so if all the proceeds will go to others. 
                                                                                                                                     
34 See Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, How the Chrysler Reorganization 
Differed from Prior Practice, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4-5, 19  n.14 (2013). 
35 See id. at 19 n.14 (indicating that Chrysler was different because "the 
debts assumed were huge obligations to Chrysler's labor suppliers"). 
36 Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2007). For a more sanguine assessment, arguing that 
junior creditors do not seem to be harmed, see Jared A. Wilkerson, Defending 
the Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591, 593 (2012). 
37 The question whether the secured creditor should be entitled to all of the 
proceeds, including intangible assets such as goodwill, has become a much-
debated issue. See, e.g., Jacoby & Janger, supra note 22, at 923; see also In re 
Residential Capital, LLC, 501 B.R. 549, 610-11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2013) (ruling 
that lienholders were not entitled to lien on postpetition goodwill). 
38 Jacoby & Janger, supra note 22, at 937 n.266. 
39 Id. at 889-90. 
40 Id. at 890 n.113. 
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To quiet the unrest, the parties often agree to give at least a 
small portion of the proceeds to the debtor's unsecured creditors.41  
In many cases, this arrangement works out nicely for all of the 
parties involved.  But the payments are problematic if other, higher 
priority creditors have not been paid in full.  The payments appear 
to violate the absolute priority rule, which requires that higher 
priority creditors be paid first.42 
A similar difficulty can arise in traditional reorganization 
cases.  In some cases, particularly complex cases with a variety of 
different classes of creditors, the debtor may wish to give one 
group of creditors something extra—perhaps because they are 
particularly sympathetic creditors—such as asbestos victims in a 
case involving asbestos liability.  If the debtor offers this class of 
creditors a special payout, but is unwilling or unable to pay a 
higher priority class of creditors in full, the proposal may violate 
the absolute priority rule.43  If the class of creditors that is left out 
has the same priority as the favored class, rather than a higher 
priority, the proposal may violate another rule, bankruptcy's 
prohibition against "unfair discrimination."44 
To sidestep these difficulties, debtors and their favored 
creditors have employed a strategy known as "gifting" in a number 
of recent cases.  In a gifting transaction, a senior creditor gives 
some of its own recovery to another class of creditors.45  A senior 
creditor that is entitled to $100, for instance, may accept a payout 
of $90 and gift the other $10 to a junior creditor.  Although the $10 
                                                                                                                                     
41 See Roe & Chung, supra note 34, at 8. 
42 The absolute priority rule, which is set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) 
(2012), precludes a lower priority class from receiving any payment if a non-
consenting, higher priority class will not be paid in full. 
43 See id. (establishing priority requirements for different classes of claims 
and interests). 
44 Like absolute priority, the unfair discrimination requirement appears in 
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). See supra note 43. It too can be waived if a class that is 
being discriminated against agrees to the treatment. See Brad B. Erens & 
Timothy W. Hoffman, The Triumph of the Trade Creditor in Chapter 11 
Reorganization, 9 PRATT'S J. BANKR. L. 26 (2013) (discussing various 
applications of such waivers). 
45 See, e.g., Leah M. Eisenberg, Gifting and Asset Reallocation in Chapter 
11 Proceedings: A Synthesized Approach, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 50, 50 (2010) 
(defending gifting as facilitating an efficient reorganization process). 
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payment to the junior creditor appears to violate the absolute 
priority rule if an intermediate priority creditor receives nothing, 
advocates of the transaction insist that nothing is amiss.46  Since 
the entire $100 belongs to the senior creditor, the intermediate 
creditor is not entitled to anything, and the senior creditor's 
decision to transfer a portion of its recovery to the junior creditor 
does not change that.47 
If the value of the secured creditor's collateral could be 
determined with precision in every case—if we could be certain it 
is worth $100—gifting might not be especially problematic.  But 
valuation is a messy business, which suggests that gifting could 
easily be subject to abuse.48  A century ago, in one of the most 
important bankruptcy cases ever, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
an analogous transaction on precisely these grounds.49 
In keeping with each of these concerns, courts have been 
increasingly skeptical of gifting arrangements.  After one circuit 
court upheld a gifting transaction, two others have struck them 
down.50  But gifting has not disappeared, and it was a key feature 
of the Detroit restructuring, as we shall see. 
III.  THE CHRYSLER AND GENERAL MOTORS BANKRUPTCIES 
As the Auto Task Force deliberated over the fate of Chrysler 
and General Motors in early 2009, it became increasingly clear that 
                                                                                                                                     
46 See, e.g., id. (stating that such transactions "should pass legal muster" if 
done properly). 
47  See id. (explaining that senior creditors often make such a gift to 
discourage or settle litigation attacking the senior creditor's security interest). 
48 As Douglas Baird puts it, the essential "problem with gifting is not the 
skipping over of a class per se, but the possibility that the gift is being  
used to buy cooperation." Douglas G. Baird, Lessons from the Automobile 
Reorganizations, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 291-92 (2012). 
49 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913). 
50 Compare In re SPM Mfg. Corp., 984 F.2d 1305, 1307, 1313-14 (1st Cir. 
1993) (upholding gifting), with In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 
507, 509, 513-15, 517 (3d Cir. 2005) (striking down a gifting transaction), and 
In re DBSD N. Am., 634 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2011) (striking down a gifting 
transaction). 
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there was no realistic alternative other than bankruptcy.51  But a 
bankruptcy filing would create several very serious problems.  
First, a lengthy bankruptcy case could be devastating to the 
carmakers, as confidence in their future waned and car buyers 
looked elsewhere for their cars.52  Yet bankruptcies involving large 
corporations historically have taken several years to complete, 
sometimes longer. Second, the administration wanted to protect the 
carmakers' unionized employees, who had recently renegotiated 
their collective bargaining agreements, from any additional 
hardship.53  Historically, however, union contracts and benefits had 
been significantly restructured in other bankruptcy cases, such as 
the bankruptcies of United, U.S. Air, and Delta.54 
Until very recently, no one would have dreamed that there 
might be a way to put Chrysler and General Motors through "quick 
rinse" bankruptcies that lasted only thirty or forty days, and which 
protected some general creditors while radically restructuring the 
carmakers' obligations to others. Indeed, when rumors first 
surfaced that the Auto Task Force expected to complete the 
Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies in one or two months, 
many experts were skeptical.55  Yet the dramatic shifts in corporate 
bankruptcy practice made an unusually quick bankruptcy case less 
                                                                                                                                     
51 Steven Rattner, a member of the Auto Task Force, has recounted the 
process that led to conclusion that bankruptcy would be necessary. See, e.g., 
STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION'S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 67 (2010). 
52  The potential effect on consumers' willingness to buy cars was the 
excuse GM's chief executive gave for refusing to seriously consider the 
bankruptcy option. See, e.g., Bob Sechler, Wagoner Says GM Won't File for 
Bankruptcy or Reduce Brands, WALL ST. J. (July 11, 2008), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB121573308128544183. 
53  See generally RATTNER, supra note 51, at 37-38 (discussing the 
concessions made by the unions). 
54 See Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transformation: The Disappearance of 
Labor Policies in Applying Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 434 n.125, 435 n.127 (2007) (noting that the cuts to 
union benefits in the airline bankruptcies are a common trend in restructuring). 
55 Including this one.  See Joann Muller, Can America's Carmakers Inspire 
Confidence?, FORBES.COM (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/
03/31/gm-chrysler-consumer-confidence-business-autos-confidence.html 
(quoting David Skeel as saying " 'I don't think it is a few week thing' " and  
" 'GM is not a classic in-and-out type of company' "). 
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unthinkable.  No debtor as large and complex as Chrysler or GM 
had resolved its financial distress nearly this fast, but the 
combination of lender control and section 363 sales had made short 
cases almost routine for smaller corporate debtors.  The Auto Task 
Force and its bankruptcy lawyers used these features of current 
cases as their template and extended them to radically new 
extremes. 
In each case, the basic transaction was a section 363 sale of all 
of the car companies' good assets to newly created entities known 
as New Chrysler and New GM, with the U.S. government serving 
both as debtor-in-possession (DIP) financer and as lender to the 
new entity.56  New Chrysler paid $2 billion to acquire Chrysler's 
assets, but also agreed to assume $5.3 billion in trade debt and to 
give 55% of New Chrysler's stock and a $4.6 billion note to 
Chrysler retirees for their healthcare benefits. 57  The GM 
transaction was similar, except that New GM actually did not pay 
anything for the assets it received.58  (As it turned out, the GM 
transaction was less problematic because GM's creditors were not 
harmed by the fictitious sale: GM paid the senior creditors in full 
and GM's junior creditors probably received more than they would 
have in an ordinary Chapter 11 reorganization.)59 
Three features of the Chrysler and GM transactions, each 
inspired by developments in recent Chapter 11 practice, are of 
particular note. The first is the dominant role of the DIP financer.60  
The carmaker bankruptcies most closely resemble a bankruptcy 
case in which the same entity serves both as lender and as buyer.  
                                                                                                                                     
56  For a description of the Chrysler transaction in detail and the GM 
transaction more briefly, see Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 733-34, 765. 
57 Id. at 733 (describing the Chrysler transaction). 
58  Id. at 750; see also Todd L. Friedman, The Unjustified Business 
Justification Rule: A Reexamination of the Lionel Canon in Light of the 
Bankruptcies of Lehman, Chrysler, and General Motors, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. 
L.J. 181, 218 (2010) (stating that New GM took on debt of Old GM in exchange 
for the assets it received). 
59  See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 765. For a more critical 
assessment of the GM case, see Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, 
Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375, 1377. 
60 See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 24, at 784-85; Skeel, supra 
note 24, at 919. 
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Sales to a DIP financer—often called loan-to-own transactions—
are the most worrisome form of sales, due to information 
asymmetries between the lender-buyer and other potential 
bidders.61  Thanks to its privileged access to the debtor's books and 
records, a financing buyer is likely to have better information than 
other potential bidders. The information disparity chills bidding, 
creating the risk that the financing buyer will acquire the debtor's 
assets for much less than they are worth. Although loan-to-own 
transactions can be entirely legitimate, they warrant careful 
scrutiny to discourage abuse. 
The government did enjoy extensive access to information 
about Chrysler and General Motors, but a more significant chilling 
effect probably came from potential bidders' knowledge that the 
government's motives were not economic. The government was 
anxious to control the restructuring process and might therefore 
have been willing to pay more than the companies' assets were 
worth, if necessary.62  None of this was illegitimate by itself—and 
nothing in the bankruptcy laws precludes the government from 
serving as financer or buyer—but it underscored the difficulty of 
creating an effective auction and the need for unusual vigilance. 
The second distinctive feature was the nature of the sales.  As 
already noted, buyers often assume a few of the debtor's 
obligations when they purchase a company's assets in a bankruptcy 
sale.63  With Chrysler and GM, by contrast, the proportions were 
reversed, with small purchase prices and very large commitments 
to assume liabilities to favored creditors. The price paid for 
Chrysler was $2 billion, and the liabilities assumed were roughly 
$10 billion.64  In the GM bankruptcy, there was no purchase price 
at all.65 
The car bailouts looked less like genuine sales and much more 
like reorganizations, in which some creditors were favored 
                                                                                                                                     
61 See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 27, at 465; see Michelle M. Harner, 
Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at the Gate?, 89 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 157, 169-70 (2011) (reviewing the potential issues of loan-to-own 
investments). 
62 See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 748. 
63 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
64 See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
65 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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(retirees, trade creditors) and others cut off (general unsecured 
creditors, terminated dealerships).  Bankruptcy judges are aware of 
the risk that bankruptcy sales can be used to achieve a disguised 
reorganization that evades the procedural protections Chapter 11 
provides for an ordinary reorganization. Proposed sales that 
actually are "sub rosa" plans of reorganization come in for 
condemnation in the case law. 66   In upholding the sales, the 
Chrysler and GM courts seemed to stretch the sub rosa plan 
doctrine beyond recognition.67 
The final key feature was the terms of the Chrysler and GM 
auctions. The stalking horse bidder in a proposed bankruptcy sale 
often asks for bid protections, such as a requirement that bids must 
exceed the current bid by a specified minimum amount or that only 
bids for the entire company will be considered.68   In the auto 
bankruptcies, the government asked for qualified bidder 
requirements that went far beyond any that a previous court had 
ever approved.69  The government proposed that no bid be allowed 
unless the bidder promised to protect precisely the same favored 
creditors as were protected by the government's bid.70  In Chrysler, 
for instance, bidders would be required to assume the 
approximately $5.3 billion of trade claims and offer stock and a 
nearly $4.6 billion note to retirees.71  A bidder could not simply 
bid, say, $2.5 billion, for Jeep, even though such a bid would 
provide more proceeds than the government's $2 billion bid.72 
If the bankruptcy judge had rejected the government's highly 
restrictive bidding rule altogether, the prospect of a legitimate 
                                                                                                                                     
66 In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983). 
67 See Roe & Skeel, supra note 14, at 753-56 (characterizing the Chrysler 
sale as a "de facto reorganization, not an arm's-length transaction"). 
68 Id. at 747; see also supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
69 The closest prior analogue to Chrysler was the sale of Trans World 
Airlines, Inc.'s (TWA) assets to American Airlines, but the TWA sale explicitly 
invited alternative bids and bids for any part of the company. See In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., No. 01-00056 (PJW), 2001 WL 1820326, at *6 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2001). 
70 In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 108-09 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
71 Id. at 90-92. 
72 See Motion of Debtors and Debtors in Possession ¶ 56, In re Chrysler 
LLC, No. 09-50002, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2009) (stating that the qualified 
bidding procedures as modified by the court must be followed). 
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auction would have cured, at least in part, some of the other 
problems with the transactions.  To his credit, the bankruptcy judge 
in Chrysler did insist on a slight modification of the bidding 
rules.73  But the final rule fell far short of creating a meaningful 
auction.  It required only that the debtor take a look at any non-
qualifying bid, and then decide—after consultation with the U.S. 
Treasury and Chrysler's unions (as well as the creditors' 
committee), precisely the parties most interested in the 
government's arrangement—whether the non-qualifying bid should 
be considered.74 
The Chrysler and GM transactions extended the domain of 
section 363 far beyond anything that had ever previously been 
attempted. In effect, they validated the use of sales to effect 
transactions that were not really sales at all, and which had the 
effect of favoring certain groups of creditors while leaving out 
others.75 
IV.  DETROIT'S GRAND BARGAIN 
The centerpiece of the Detroit bankruptcy case was a 
transaction that participants in the case call the "Grand Bargain."  
Under the terms of the Grand Bargain, Detroit transferred the 
Detroit Institute of Arts (DIA) and its art in return for $816 million 
to a nonprofit foundation that is legally obligated to keep the art in 
Detroit.76  Of this amount, $366 million will come from Kresge 
and other foundations,77 $350 million from the state of Michigan,78 
                                                                                                                                     
73 In re Chrysler LLC, 504 B.R. at 93. 
74 Id. at 108-09 & n.25. 
75 The carmaker bailouts were remarkably similar in form to the equity 
receivership transactions used before large scale reorganization was codified in 
the 1930s, which one prominent New Deal progressive derided as "a mockery 
and a sham." Jerome N. Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of 
Corporate Reorganization, 19 VA. L. REV. 541, 555-56 (1933). 
76 For a description of the Grand Bargain, see Fourth Amended Disclosure 
Statement With Respect to Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of 
the City of Detroit at 65-66, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. May 5, 2014) [hereinafter Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement] 
(describing the transaction as the "DIA Settlement"). 
77 Id. at 65. 
78 Id. at 66. 
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and $100 million from funds raised by the DIA itself. 79  The 
proceeds will be used to increase the payout to Detroit's pension 
beneficiaries.80 
When a bankruptcy lawyer and I described the transaction to a 
table of bankruptcy experts at a bankruptcy conference several 
weeks after the Grand Bargain was first announced, several 
literally started shouting.  "That's a fraudulent transfer!" one of 
them insisted; another said: "You can't do that!"  They questioned 
both the purchase price, which seemed considerably lower than the 
museum's art is worth, and the use of the proceeds to pay one 
group of general creditors—the pension recipients—but not others. 
Yet, the Detroit bankruptcy judge approved it. The Grand 
Bargain was the culmination of his and the chief mediator's 
handling of the Detroit bankruptcy.81 
To understand the contrasting perspectives, it will be helpful 
to begin with the role of the bankruptcy judge and mediator in the 
Detroit case. I will then show how the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies made the Grand Bargain possible, and also how they 
seem to have inspired other features of the Detroit plan. 
A.  The Role of Detroit's Bankruptcy Judge and Mediator 
As the U.S. government was deciding where to file the 
Chrysler and GM cases, the logical location would have been the 
Eastern District of Michigan, which is centered in Detroit.  After 
all, the carmakers have been synonymous with Detroit for nearly a 
century.  Yet, the government instructed Chrysler and GM to file 
their bankruptcy cases in New York. Although neither the 
government nor other insiders have publicly explained the choice 
of filing location, 82  rumors circulated at the time that the 
                                                                                                                                     
79 Id. at 65. 
80 Id. 
81 See, e.g., Matt Helms, Orr: Duggan, City Council are Ready to Run 
Detroit, DETROIT FREE PRESS, http://archive.freep.com/article/20140713/
NEWS01/307130093/ (quoting praise by Professor Laura Bartell after the Grand 
Bargain was announced: "The one-two punch of Judge Rhodes and Judge Rosen 
on his team has been brilliant . . . .What they have achieved so far has been 
remarkable."). 
82 See generally Tom Hals, Detroit Bankruptcy Judge Finally Gets His Big 
Case, CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-07-
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government was concerned about the lack of experience in the 
Eastern District of Michigan with major bankruptcy cases and 
about the court's administrative capacity to handle the huge 
number of claims and proceedings in such a large case. 
Despite being happy with the government bailout, prominent 
Michigan officials, such as Representative John Conyers, 
complained bitterly about the decision to file the carmaker 
bankruptcies in New York.83  The most prominent of the local 
bankruptcy judges, Steven Rhodes, was also critical, questioning 
the choice of filing location at several bankruptcy conferences. 
Detroit's bankruptcy filing was thus a second chance for the 
local bankruptcy community, and it led to a flurry of behind-the-
scenes maneuvering.  With an ordinary corporate or consumer 
bankruptcy case, the judge who will oversee the case is assigned 
randomly.84  In a municipal bankruptcy case, by contrast, there is 
nothing random about the assignment.  The chief judge of the court 
of appeals overseeing the district in which the case is filed picks 
the judge who will handle the case.85   When Detroit filed for 
bankruptcy, the Chief Judge of the district court, Judge Gerald 
Rosen, sent a letter to Judge Alice Batchelder, Chief Judge of the 
Eighth Circuit, strongly encouraging her to select Judge Rhodes.86  
Shortly after Judge Batchelder did indeed assign the Detroit 
bankruptcy to him, Judge Rhodes asked Judge Rosen to serve as 
                                                                                                                                     
23/news/sns-rt-us-usa-detroit-judge-20130719_1_bankruptcy-judge-chief-judge-
eastern-district (describing without explaining the decisions of GM and Chrysler 
to file for bankruptcy in New York). 
83 Id. 
84
 LEI LEI WANG EKVALL & EVAN D. SMILEY, BANKRUPTCY FOR 
BUSINESSES: THE BENEFITS, PITFALLS, AND ALTERNATIVES 30 (Jere Calmes ed., 
2007). 
85 11 U.S.C. § 921(b) (2012).  Congress apparently was concerned to make 
sure that municipal bankruptcies would be overseen by judges who had 
sufficient expertise and experience. For discussion of Judge Steven Rhodes' 
expertise and experience, see Tresa Baldas & Brent Snavely, Judge Steven 
Rhodes Selected to Oversee Detroit Bankruptcy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 19, 
2013, 11:07 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130719/NEWS01/307190070
/Detroit-bankruptcy-judge-financial-crisis. 
86  See Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy to Get a Mediator: Federal 
Judge Gerald Rosen is Apparent Pick, USA TODAY (July 24, 2013, 7:39 AM), 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/24/detroit-
bankruptcy-mediator/2582003/; Baldas & Snavely, supra note 85. 
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the chief mediator in the case.87  In that role, Judge Rosen oversaw 
mediation on nearly every major issue in the case. 
Although the precise threads are not clear, the Grand Bargain 
appears to have been inspired by Judge Rosen.  Early in the case, 
Judge Rosen hinted to a reporter that major national foundations 
could be expected to donate money to protect Detroit's art, which 
suggests that he was thinking about a major transaction from the 
beginning.88  Rosen himself is a former Republican candidate for 
Congress89 and has significant ties in Michigan political circles, as 
well as with the Detroit Institute of Art.  As the framework for the 
Grand Bargain emerged, Judge Rosen actively lobbied for 
contributions from a variety of art world foundations.90  He also 
circulated among Michigan Republican politicians to raise support 
for the legislation that would authorize Michigan to contribute.91  
Several weeks before the start of the confirmation trial in 
September 2014, a major creditor complained that Judge Rosen 
was biased,92 which prompted a remarkable ruling by Judge Rosen 
striking the creditor's objections from the record.93 
                                                                                                                                     
87 See Bomey, supra note 86. 
88 The statement in the text is based on a phone conversation on June 21, 
2014, with a reporter who closely followed the case. Rosen himself has 
described the original inspiration as having come from a chance encounter with 
a local foundation president. See Helms, supra note 81 ("Rosen bumped into 
Mariam Noland, president of the Community Foundation for Southeast 
Michigan, at a Detroit deli last fall.  As Rosen tells the story, Noland asked 
casually whether there was anything she could do to help."); see also Matthew 
Dolan, The Doodle That Drove Detroit Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8-9, 2014, at 
A5 (describing the Grand Bargain as originating when Rosen "wrote the word 
'art' on [a] pad and drew a box around it," and then "drew an arrow from the box 
to where he had written the word 'pensions' "). 
89 See Bomey, supra note 86. 
90 See Mark Stryker & John Gallagher, DIA Joins Deal in Works With 
Mediators That Would Protect Art, Pensions in Detroit Bankruptcy, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:22 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20131211/
NEWS01/312110114/DIA-joins-deal-works-mediators-would-protect-art-
pensions-Detroit-bankruptcy. 
91 See Helms, supra note 81; see also Detroit's "Grand Bargain" Sweeps 
Ahead, MICHIGAN NEWS, http://newsinmi.com/detroits-grand-bargain-sweeps-
ahead-2/ (quoting lawmaker as saying Rosen was not lobbying, just explaining 
the details) (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
92  Syncora Guaranty Inc. and Syncora Capital Assurance Inc.'s Second 
Supplemental Objection to the Debtor's Plan of Adjustment at 2, 20-21, In re 
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It is possible that, in addition to lobbying for the Grand 
Bargain, Judge Rosen also devised it.  But it seems equally likely 
that Detroit's bankruptcy lawyers worked out the details, or that 
both played a role.  As it turns out, Detroit's emergency manager 
and its bankruptcy lawyers all come from precisely the same law 
firm that handled the Chrysler bankruptcy.94 
B. Assessing the Grand Bargain 
The Grand Bargain was a remarkable solution to several of the 
most vexing problems in the Detroit bankruptcy.  The first was the 
perceived risk that Detroit's world-class art collection might need 
to be sold and the proceeds used to pay creditors.95  This concern 
was quite real to those who love art, and the insistence that a great 
art museum is important to Detroit's future had a significant 
element of truth.96  But as they campaigned to protect the art, art 
advocates risked being perceived as more concerned about the 
interests of wealthy art patrons than about the plight of struggling 
Detroiters.  The second problem was the desire to minimize the 
hardship of the case on Detroit's pension beneficiaries,97 many of 
whom depend on the relatively limited pensions, despite the 
general bankruptcy principle that one class of general creditors 
                                                                                                                                     
City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 
Syncora Second Supplemental Objection]. 
93 Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike and Order to Show Cause Why 
Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed Under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2014) 
[hereinafter Order Granting in Part Motion to Strike]. 
94 Jones Day was debtor's council for Chrysler and is now council for 
Detroit. Kevyn D. Orr, the emergency manager, was one of the main Jones Day 
partners involved in the Chrysler bankruptcy. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 
125, 157-58, 181, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013). 
95 See, e.g., Art for Sale? Bankruptcy and the Detroit Institute of Arts: 
Q&A, 14 IFAR J. 49, 49 (2014) (describing petition of support being circulated 
by Harvard professor Jeffrey Hamburger). 
96  "I would like to maintain that a dead DIA runs counter to what, 
ultimately, [the emergency manager's] charge is," the museum's president said at 
a panel discussion in New York, "which is to put the city back on the road to 
prosperity and success." Id. 
97 See Alexander Volokh, Pension Protection and the Detroit Bankruptcy, 
REASON FOUNDATION (Apr. 2, 2014), http://reason.org/news/show/volokh-
detroit-pension-protection (examining the pension issue in Detroit's bankruptcy). 
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should not be treated differently than others.  The Grand Bargain 
cleverly addressed both problems.  It protected the art by requiring 
that it permanently remain in Detroit.98  It boosted the payout to 
Detroit's pension beneficiaries by $816 million and directed the 
proceeds to the pensions,99 thus preempting complaints that only 
the elite benefit.100 
The only concern with the Grand Bargain was that it did not 
appear to be legal.101  The transaction was remarkably similar to 
the Chrysler and GM transactions, relying as they did on a 
fictitious sale that was designed to favor some groups of creditors 
over others.102  Indeed, it seems unlikely that the Grand Bargain 
would ever have been tried if it were not for the carmaker bailout 
precedent.  With both of its key features, the fictitious sale and the 
favoring of one group of creditors, the Grand Bargain was in some 
respects even more audacious than Chrysler or GM. 
Start with the fictional sale. The Chrysler and GM transactions 
each at least purported to leave open the possibility that another 
buyer could acquire the assets if it made an alternative bid.  Detroit 
made clear that it would not be considering alternative 
transactions.  When creditors announced that they had found four 
additional buyers, each of which had expressed interest in making 
a bid in excess of $816 million, Detroit refused to schedule talks 
                                                                                                                                     
98 See Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement, supra note 76, at 65. 
99 Id. 
100 See, e.g., Helms, supra note 81 (reporting strong support for the plan by 
retirees). 
101 Nathan Bomey, Detroit's Bankruptcy Battle Begins, USA TODAY (Sept. 
2, 2014, 3:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/31/
detroit-bankruptcy-trial-begins/14899547/ (highlighting two bond insurers' 
assertions that the Grand Bargain was illegal and unfairly favored pensioners). 
102 See, e.g., Syncora Capital Assurance Inc. and Syncora Guarantee Inc.'s 
Objection to the Debtor's Plan of Adjustment at 31, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-
53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 12, 2014) [hereinafter Syncora Objection to 
Debtor's Plan of Adjustment] (describing Detroit as "diverting over a billion 
dollars of value from multiple sources, including the DIA and Foundations on 
account of the art, State Contribution Agreement, UTGO Settlement, and the 
DWSD, solely for the benefit of Pension Claims"). 
142 WIDENER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24 
with any of the bidders. 103  The city insisted that it had no 
obligation to consider other bids.104 
As remarkable as this may sound to those who are not familiar 
with the peculiarities of Chapter 9, Detroit had plausible legal 
grounds for taking this position.  Due to concerns about interfering 
with state sovereignty, Chapter 9 does not require even the 
bankruptcy judge's approval if Detroit wishes to sell some of its 
assets.105  Detroit therefore could not be forced to sell the art, and 
when Detroit did decide to sell the art, it could not be forced to 
consider other possible buyers.106 
The fictional sale could, however, be challenged indirectly.  
To confirm a debt adjustment plan, Detroit needed to show that the 
plan was in the "best interest of the creditors."107  Precisely what 
this means is unclear. In Chapter 11, the debtor must pay each 
creditor at least as much as it would receive in a liquidation,108 but 
                                                                                                                                     
103 See Steven Church, Katya Kazakina, & Chris Christoff, Detroit's Orr 
Shoots Down Creditors' $2 Billion Art Offer, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-09/detroit-bond-insurers-say-city-
could-get-2-billion-for-art.html (describing the bids and noting that at least one 
of the four bidders also agreed to keep the art within Detroit). 
104 See id. ("Just like New York didn't have to build co-ops in Central Park 
when it was going through its troubles, Detroit should not have to denude itself," 
stated Emergency Manager, Kevyn Orr, in refusing to consider other bids.). 
105  11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012) (prohibiting the bankruptcy court from 
interfering with a municipality's governmental functions).  Consistent with this 
concern, section 901 does not incorporate section 363(b), which requires court 
approval of sales in consumer and corporate bankruptcy cases. Id. § 901. 
106 Syncora argued that the sale was a fraudulent transfer under Michigan 
law because Detroit would not receive reasonably equivalent value for its art and 
Detroit was insolvent. Syncora Objection to Debtor's Plan of Adjustment, supra 
note 92, at 58 n.59. Although the art does seem to have been worth more than 
$816 million, even taking into account questions concerning what Detroit 
actually owned, Detroit is probably solvent as a result of the restructuring of its 
debt. A legal opinion by Michigan's attorney general, arguing the art cannot be 
sold, emphasized the uncertainty about the nature of Detroit's ownership interest 
in the art. See generally BILL SCHUETTE, MICH. ATT'Y GEN., Opinion No. 7272, 
CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER OF DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ARTS COLLECTION 13-
14, 18-22 (Jun. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Opinion No. 7272], available at 
http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/AGO%207272.pdf. (arguing 
that the museum was a charitable trust). 
107 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). 
108 Id. § 1129(a)(7). 
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liquidation is not an option for a municipal debtor.109  Courts have 
interpreted the test to require a showing that the debtor's plan is the 
best available alternative, usually as compared to what the 
creditors would have received if the debtor had never filed for 
bankruptcy. 110  Under this test, creditors could object (and did 
object) that a sale of the art for an inadequate price squandered 
proceeds that would otherwise have been available for creditors.111 
The question then was whether the $816 million price tag was 
too great a bargain. The estimates that were released during the 
case suggest that it probably was, but the valuation questions are 
debatable.112 
As with the fictional sale, the Grand Bargain's mechanism for 
favoring one class of creditors over others was even more 
remarkable than the sleight of hand used by Chrysler and GM. 
Unlike the car companies, Detroit made no pretense of treating its 
creditors evenhandedly under the Grand Bargain.  It funneled the 
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proceeds of the transaction directly to pension beneficiaries and 
did not give any proceeds to other creditors.113  As a result of the 
Grand Bargain, pension beneficiaries will receive a much higher 
percentage recovery than several other classes of creditors. 
The Chapter 9 provision that calls this kind of favoritism into 
question is the prohibition against "unfair discrimination."114  As 
with the best interest of creditors test,115 the precise contours of 
unfair discrimination are unsettled.  Some courts have suggested 
that the requirement is violated if there is any significant difference 
in the recovery of one class as compared to another class that has 
not agreed to accept a lesser recovery.  Others have adopted more 
nuanced approaches that permit some separate treatment if there is 
a legitimate basis for the differentiation.116 
Although there are good reasons to give pension beneficiaries 
a somewhat higher recovery than other general creditors, the stark 
difference between their proposed payout and the recovery for 
several groups of bondholders is difficult to reconcile with the 
unfair discrimination rule.117  But unfair discrimination claims can 
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only be invoked by classes of creditors that have objected to the 
reorganization plan.118 By the time Judge Rhodes ruled on Detroit's 
proposed plan of adjustment in late 2014, the major objecting 
creditors had settled their disputes with the city.  Although the 
objection did not disappear altogether—it was raised by two other 
classes of creditors—the most vigorous critics were gone.  Judge 
Rhodes rejected the challenge, as expected. 119  The special 
treatment of pensions was justified, he concluded, because they 
were central to Detroit's mission, whereas the disfavored creditors, 
in his view, were not.120   
C. The Gifting Transaction 
In addition to the $816 million from the Grand Bargain, the 
pension recipients' payout was further enhanced by an unusual 
gifting transaction.  Holders of a class of Detroit bonds known as 
Unlimited Tax General Obligations insisted that they were fully 
collateralized by Detroit's commitment to raise its ad valorem 
taxes to ensure payment of the bonds.123  Countering this claim, 
Detroit insisted that the bonds were simply general obligation 
bonds.124  After negotiating under the direction of Judge Rosen, the 
mediator and the parties agreed that Detroit would pay the full 
amount of the bonds, but that 74% would go to the bondholders 
and 26% to pensions.125 
The bond settlement is a classic illustration of the dangers of 
gifting.  If the bondholders were clearly entitled to full payment 
and opted to give a portion of their recovery to a lower priority 
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class such as the pensions, the gift might be defensible.  But the 
bondholders' secured status was in doubt, which would imply 
something less than a 100% recovery. This raises serious questions 
about the legitimacy of the gift—questions that are in a sense 
subsumed into the unfair discrimination analysis, since the effect is 
to increase the payout to pension recipients. 
V.  THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY SALES 
It is often remarked that a tendency, when pushed to extremes, 
can begin to look a great deal like its opposite. Far right-wing 
politics may have more in common with socialism, for instance, 
than with moderate right-wing politics; left-wing socialism can 
begin to look like totalitarianism.  The car bailouts and Detroit 
restructuring have brought this phenomenon to bankruptcy.  The 
most distinctive feature of bankruptcy practice over the past twenty 
years has been the increasing role of the market transactions.126  
The expanded use of bankruptcy sales as an alternative to the 
traditional reorganization process is the culmination of this trend. 
In one sense, the car bailouts extended this trajectory to its furthest 
extremes, effecting a sale of companies much larger and more 
complex than any previous bankruptcy sale.  In another sense, 
however, they inverted the trend.  The carmaker sales were almost 
completely insulated from the markets and did not look like real 
sales at all. The Detroit Grand Bargain built on this pattern, 
removing all possibility of competing offers for a sale of Detroit's 
art. 
The most obvious lesson from the cases is the need for more 
meaningful oversight of bankruptcy sales, at least in the Chapter 
11 context.127  Bankruptcy judges have devised ad hoc protections 
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such as the requirement that proposed sales be subject to a market 
test.128  But these protections are notably incomplete, especially in 
unusual cases like the Chrysler and General Motors bankruptcies.  
Scholars have proposed a variety of additional correctives, a few of 
which may warrant more serious consideration than scholarly 
proposals usually receive. 
The current proposals fall into three general categories. Some 
would impose procedural safeguards such as eschewing qualified 
bid requirements that dictate how the business will be run after the 
sale or what obligations would be assumed,129 or counting only the 
cash portion of a bid in comparing bids.130   A second general 
approach focuses on bankruptcy court scrutiny of a particular sale. 
The enhanced scrutiny might take the form of a strengthened and 
clarified prohibition against sub rosa plans of reorganization131 or 
a more general invitation for the bankruptcy court to "make an 
independent assessment of whether the proposed sale is the course 
that maximizes the value of whatever is being sold for the benefit 
of the estate."132  Third, to counter concerns that sales may give 
secured creditors value that actually should go to other creditors, 
two other commentators propose that part of the sales proceeds be 
set aside as a bond. 133   I personally am partial to additional 
procedural protections, together with a strengthened prohibition 
against sub rosa reorganizations.  But each of the proposals I have 
described might improve both the efficacy and perceived fairness 
of the sales process. 
The car bailouts were often described as one-off cases, with 
few implications for bankruptcy practice.  Detroit's Grand Bargain 
has made clear that the innovations used in the car bailouts have 
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not disappeared. Each of these cases achieved an essential 
restructuring of the debtors' finances. But they also have 
underscored the need to update the bankruptcy sale provision, and 
perhaps to simplify the requirements of traditional reorganizations, 
to reflect the new landscape of bankruptcy. 
